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Economist Nathan Sheets, director of the Federal Reserve Board’s Division of 
International Finance, puts a global perspective on the current economic crisis and the 
Fed’s response to it.
Facing Financial Troubles in an Era of Globalization
A Conversation with Nathan Sheets
about decoupling. If the U.S. economy slows 
or  U.S.  financial  markets  encounter  prob-
lems, what does that mean for the rest of the 
world? There really was quite an argument 
about  decoupling  until  about  six  months 
ago, centered on the question of whether 
other  countries  could  avoid  the  troubles 
brewing in the United States. Now, it’s clear 
that we rise and fall together. 
Given  the  degree  of  integration  and 
similar  failures  of  risk  management  across 
the world, I think this episode is in some 
sense deeper than it would have been oth-
erwise. 
That doesn’t mean that there aren’t many 
positive factors from globalization. There are 
important efficiency gains, for example, but 
we’re seeing that we’re tied together and that 
we have many common vulnerabilities and 
shortcomings. We need to work together to 
manage these challenges and the responses 
to them.
Q. How does the international dimension affect 
the Fed’s analysis and actions?
A. Let me give you a concrete example. Many 
financial  institutions  outside  the  U.S.  have 
had significant demand for short-term dollar 
funding. They made loans to corporations in 
dollars or bought U.S.-denominated assets, 
and they needed dollars to fund those assets. 
I can’t think of a previous instance of finan-
cial stress associated with such pronounced 
demand for dollars outside our borders.
The interbank markets these institutions 
depended on for funding essentially froze up 
last fall, and it created huge excess demand 
for short-term dollar liquidity abroad. Many 
of these foreign institutions would come to 
New York or other U.S. markets in search of 
dollars, so it would at times spill over into 
our markets and create stresses. 
In response, the Fed joined with other 
major central banks to create a network of 
swap  facilities,  where  we  provide  foreign 
central banks dollar liquidity and they give 
us an equivalent amount of their currencies. 
They then lend these dollars to financial in-
stitutions in their economies that need them. 
There’s very little risk for the Fed. We have 
claims on the foreign central banks as well 
hit  consumer  and  business  confidence.  It’s 
true in the U.S., U.K. and euro area, where the 
financial shock has been intense, but it’s also 
true in emerging-market economies, where 
they didn’t have the financial exposure. 
Q. How has the accelerating globalization of 
recent decades shaped this crisis?
A. The fact that we’re more globalized now 
has been one of the extraordinary features 
of  this  crisis.  You  look  at  trends  in  many 
financial  markets—the  U.S.  line,  the  U.K. 
line, the euro-area line, the Japan line—and 
they’re all moving together more or less in 
lockstep. The degree of integration has been 
phenomenal.
Part of that is a reflection of the fact that 
our financial markets were highly integrated, 
so subprime loans issued here ended up on 
foreign balance sheets. We’re also very inte-
grated through trade channels, meaning that 
the slowdown that’s occurred as a result of 
this financial shock has hit other economies 
and fed back into ours. 
One way of framing this is the debate 
Q. For more than a year, we’ve been trying 
to contain a global financial crisis. What went 
wrong?
A.  The  global  economy  has  sustained  the 
most  intense  and  far-reaching  financial 
shock in at least 50 years, a truly phenom-
enal  financial  shock.  A  number  of  factors 
have contributed to it. Most important, our 
major financial institutions weren’t managing 
risk in a careful and prudent way. There’s 
plenty of blame to go around. We should 
also include credit rating agencies, the regu-
lators, corporate boards and investors. There 
was a breakdown in the capacity to analyze 
and understand the risk in the system.
A lot of folks see this crisis as first and 
foremost about housing. I see housing being 
more of a trigger that brought this failure of 
risk management to light.
Q. What does all this mean for your 
bailiwick—international finance?
A. The implications for the financial system 
are profound. We’ve seen a huge increase 
in risk aversion among investors. We’ve seen 
marked stresses in various kinds of financial 
markets, ranging from very short-term inter-
bank markets all the way to longer-term debt 
markets.  Equity  prices  have  fallen  signifi-
cantly. There aren’t many markets that have 
escaped the blow. 
We’re now seeing those financial shocks 
having a real impact on spending, produc-
tion and GDP across the globe. I see this oc-
curring through three important channels. 
First, banks’ willingness to lend has sig-
nificantly deteriorated, so firms and individ-
uals aren’t getting the credit they need. 
Second,  we’ve  seen  a  huge  adverse 
wealth shock. With stock markets down as 
much as 50 percent and housing prices falling 
in a number of countries, people don’t have 
the balance sheets to sustain spending. 
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“The global stresses we’ve been facing have made it all the   
more important that central banks interact to keep each   
other informed and, where possible, even coordinate policy.”
articulated resolution process for 
a wider range of financial institu-
tions. We have a good mechanism 
for addressing commercial banks 
under stress, but there’s nothing 
comparable for some other types 
of institutions. 
Q. More broadly, has globalization 
affected the way the Federal 
Reserve does its job?
A.  It’s  certainly  different.  These  dollar-
funding pressures I mentioned earlier are a 
manifestation of just how much things have 
changed. We see this increased interdepen-
dence among economies and the need for 
collaboration among central banks and reg-
ulators in various countries. 
Some people have argued that the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy is being di-
minished, and I don’t see that. Globalization 
has shifted the range of variables and the 
things you need to think about. You need 
to focus not only on what’s going on within 
your own borders and your own financial 
markets but also on what’s going on in the 
rest of the world and in global financial mar-
kets. There are feedback effects that are sig-
nificant  for  assessing  economic  conditions 
and making policy decisions.
We’re constantly trying to expand our 
analytical tool kit and improve our under-
standing  of  how  economies  and  policies 
work.  It’s  not  explic-
itly global, but one issue 
we’re thinking hard about 
at the moment is the so-
called  financial  accelera-
tor  effect,  where  sharp 
declines  in  asset  prices 
hit the balance sheets of 
firms and individuals and 
make them less creditwor-
thy. This can be a mecha-
nism through which these 
kinds of financial shocks 
eat into the economy and 
become quite intense. 
Another current issue 
is the zero lower bound. 
What are the implications 
as holdings of their currencies to protect us. 
We have had to extend the scope and 
influence  of  our  liquidity  facilities  beyond 
our national borders, and that’s been a new 
challenge.
Q. Has globalization put greater emphasis on 
cooperation with other central banks? 
A. Absolutely. Central banks regularly com-
municated  through  mechanisms  that  were 
already  in  place,  but  the  global  stresses 
we’ve been facing have made it all the more 
important that central banks interact to keep 
each  other  informed  and,  where  possible, 
even coordinate policy.
The swap agreements are an important 
example of this. Another is the coordinated 
interest rate cuts by the Fed and other cen-
tral banks in early October. Easing monetary 
policy was in the interest of each of these 
economies,  but  there’s  a  strong  additional 
statement  that’s  made  when  central  banks 
show they’re cooperating to address global 
problems.
Q. What else will help us deal with global 
financial threats?
A. These aren’t just Fed issues but matters of 
the broader financial architecture. We need 
better  mechanisms  to  address  problems 
faced by very large institutions that can be 
seen as too big to fail. We also need a well-
for policy and the economy once short-term 
interest rates, the traditional tool for mon-
etary policy, have been cut to nearly zero. 
What’s the next step? 
Q. How will this financial crisis affect the pace 
of globalization? 
A. If anything, it may accelerate globalization 
in the sense that we’re now very aware that 
we need to work closely together with other 
countries on such things as financial-sector 
supervision and rating assets. Major financial 
institutions are truly global in scope, and if 
we’re approaching things one way and the 
French  another  and  the  Germans  another 
and the British another, it creates dissonance 
in the global economy. 
The leaders of the G-20 economies met 
in November in Washington, and they’re go-
ing to meet again in early April in London. 
They’re in the midst of addressing many of 
these issues in a global way, and I think we’ll 
find that process has some staying power. 
We’ll end up more integrated, more coherent 
and  more  consistent  across  countries  than 
we were before this crisis erupted. 
Along  the  way,  there’s  risk  of  protec-
tionism emerging. History teaches that we’re 
more prosperous if we’re open rather than 
closed—especially at times like this. Think 
about what happened in the Great Depres-
sion, when countries put up sizable tariffs 
and global trade collapsed. That can start a 
downward spiral for the global economy, so 
we have to guard very forcefully against pro-
tectionism.